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INTRODUCTION 
You have a U.S. patent covering invention X comprising three 
components: A, B, and C, and assume the law only protects 
inventions within the U.S.  I would be infringing your patent if, 
without permission, I used invention X within the U.S.  But what if 
invention X is partly inside the U.S. and partly outside the U.S.; 
would I still be infringing?  What if I export components A, B, and 
C to Canada and make invention X in Canada; would I be 
infringing then?  Now assume that very scenario is illegal, i.e., it is 
illegal to export components of a patented invention with the 
intention of making the patented invention outside the U.S.  What 
if A, B, and C are lines of software code and your invention is a 
video game and several hundred thousand copies are made in 
Canada; would I be liable for every copy made?  These scenarios 
depict the cutting edge problems with determining the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law. 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a long-established 
principle: “[W]e . . . insist on a clear congressional indication of 
intent to extend the patent privilege.”1  The Supreme Court’s 
 
 1 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972). 
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statement was in response to the export of components for 
combination outside the U.S.2  At issue was a patent that covered a 
working machine, but the patent did not cover the components.3  
The alleged infringer cleverly thought, and the Supreme Court 
agreed, that he could export the components and complete the 
machine outside the U.S. without violating the patent on the 
machine because he did not “make” or “use” the machine within 
the U.S.4  A few short years later, Congress passed legislation to 
close this loophole,5 thus, making it illegal to supply components 
for infringement (albeit actual infringement would occur outside 
U.S. borders).6  When infringers subtly modify their behavior to 
technically circumvent U.S. patent law and embarrass the spirit of 
U.S. patent protection, how can courts offer protection while 
abiding by the proscriptions against extraterritorial reach?  Two 
cases highlight this struggle.7  First, if the invention at issue is 
located both outside and inside U.S. borders, such as a 
transnational communications system, how do courts determine if 
an alleged infringer actually “used” the invention within the U.S.?  
Second, if the invention at issue is intangible and easily replicable, 
such as software code, how do courts determine if an alleged 
infringer actually “supplied” the components for the resulting 
copies made outside the U.S.? 
Part I of this Note discusses pertinent background including the 
original presumption against extraterritorial effect, forms of 
infringement, and types of patent claims.  Part II discusses the two 
leading cases interpreting the edges of extraterritorial reach.  
Part III analyzes the Federal Circuit’s contextual approach in the 
two leading cases on extraterritorial reach. 
 
 2 Id. at 523. 
 3 See id. at 528. 
 4 Id. at 528–29. 
 5 See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 
130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)). 
 6 Id. (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). 
 7 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Inquiry of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law begins 
with the conceptual understanding of the Federal Circuit’s 
contextual application of U.S. patent law.  U.S. patent law can 
have extraterritorial effect if the form of infringement and type of 
patent, when combined, constitute territorial subject matter.8  
Traditionally, U.S. patent law only affected acts within the United 
States.9  Historically, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted 
statutes to apply exclusively to acts inside the United States, unless 
Congress expressly stated otherwise.10  Courts have provided 
extraterritorial effect to U.S. patents not by broadly interpreting the 
Patent Act,11 but rather by broadening the concept of subject 
matter considered to be inside the United States.12  Courts have 
contextualized each infringement statute to the type of patent 
claim.13  For example, “using” a patented invention within the 
 
 8 See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1316.  “Not only will the analysis [of extraterritoriality] differ 
for different types of infringing acts, it will also differ as the result of differences between 
different types of claims.” Id.  “Extraterritorial effect” or “extraterritorial reach,” as used 
in this paper, refers to jurisdiction of U.S. patent law that extends beyond the territorial 
bounds of the United States.  “Territorial,” as used in this paper, refers to subject matter 
considered within the United States.  “Extraterritorial,” as used as an isolated term in this 
paper, refers to subject matter considered beyond jurisdiction of U.S. patent law. 
 9 See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (describing patent holder rights 
limited to the United States); Deepsouth Packing Co. 406 U.S. at 527 (citing 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a)).  The Supreme Court held that manufacture and exportation of components for 
completed assembly outside the United States did not constitute making the claimed 
combination invention. Id. at 527–28; Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property 
Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 513–16 (1997) (presenting five 
justifications for a presumption against extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law: 
international law, comity between nations, lex loci delicti, congressional intent, and 
separation-of-powers).  Bradley argued extraterritorial impact of U.S. law is a political 
and foreign policy question reserved for the Executive and Legislative branches. Id. at 
516. 
 10 See Bradley, supra note 9, at 510–12 (discussing that the Supreme Court construes 
federal statutes to have only territorial effect) (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 
213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)); see also Stanley Young, Global Aspects of United States 
Patent Protection, 823 PLI/Pat 363, 376 (2005) (describing explicit and implicit 
congressional intent underlying relevant statutes). 
 11 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (defining infringement). 
 12 See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1316. 
 13 See id.  Although the Blackberry e-mail system had a network component in Canada, 
the Federal Circuit held the system was territorial subject matter for U.S. patent law 
because Blackberry users “used” the system within the U.S. Id. at 1317.  The Federal 
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United States violates 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  However, “use” of a 
device differs from “use” of a process.14 
Part A of this section discusses the origins of the presumption 
against extraterritorial effect for U.S. patent law.  Part B discusses 
the various forms of infringement as a factor in determining 
extraterritorial effect.  Part C discusses various types of patent 
claims as a factor in determining extraterritorial effect.  Part D 
discusses the interplay between the courts and Congress in honing 
the edges of extraterritorial reach.  Part E discusses jurisdiction. 
A. Presumption against Extraterritorial Effect 
Prior to the enactment of the modern statute for patent 
infringement, the Supreme Court held “acts of Congress do not, 
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United 
States . . . .”15  In 1856, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a 
patentee’s rights over a French vessel temporarily docked at a 
Boston port.16  In 1915, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a 
patentee’s rights over grain drills sold in a foreign country despite 
the fact that the drills were made in the U.S. because the seller only 
purchased and resold the patented invention.17  After Congress 
codified the modern-day infringement laws, the Supreme Court 
remained steadfast to its longstanding tradition of viewing U.S. 
patent law with a presumption against extraterritoriality and 
 
Circuit held the Blackberry process was not territorial subject matter because users did 
not “use” the process in the U.S. Id. at 1318 (discussing that a process is merely a series 
of steps and the user did not complete the steps within the U.S. because one step occurred 
in Canada). 
 14 See id. at 1316–18 (discussing difference between use of a system and use of a 
process).  To “use” a process in the U.S. all steps of the process must be performed 
within the U.S. Id. at 1318. 
 15 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (describing the presumption that rights 
conferred on patent holders by Congress do not extend outside the United States); cf. Am. 
Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (describing reasons for a presumption against extraterritorial 
effect).  The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to a U.S. 
corporation operating in Panama and Costa Rica, because extraterritorial effect would be 
“contrary to the comity of nations . . . .” Id. 
 16 Brown, 60 U.S. at 188 (stating holding). 
 17 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (stating 
holding).  The only act of infringement the defendant committed was selling the 
invention and because the defendant sold the invention in Canada, the Supreme Court 
held “[infringement] cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.” Id. 
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refused to grant extraterritorial effect unless there was “a clear 
congressional indication of intent to extend the patent 
privilege . . . .”18 
In 1856, in Brown v. Duchesne,19 the Supreme Court held that 
an improvement aboard a French vessel did not infringe the U.S. 
patent covering the improvement because the French vessel was 
only temporarily in a U.S. port.20  The Alcyon, a French schooner, 
sailed into Boston as part of a roundtrip voyage from St. Peters, a 
French colony.21  The gaff saddle, a component of the schooner, 
incorporated an improvement covered by the plaintiff’s patent.22  
The builder of the schooner added the improvement prior to 
launching the ship “in order to fit her for sea.”23  The lower court 
held that the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s improvement 
patent, and the plaintiff appealed.24 
The Supreme Court inquired whether Congress intended for the 
patent laws to supersede the Government’s power to make treaties, 
particularly regarding international trade.25  The Court refused to 
construct a statute that would “disarm the Government of [such] a 
power . . . unless plain and express words indicated that such was 
the intention of the Legislature.”26  The Court emphasized that the 
exclusive right conferred on a patent holder concerned conduct 
 
 18 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972).  For discussion 
on Deepsouth, see infra Part I.B.1. 
 19 60 U.S. 183 (1856). 
 20 Id. at 188 (stating holding). 
 21 Id. at 193 (stating facts). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 194 (stating procedural history). 
 25 Id. at 195 (discussing separation of powers).  Prior to turning to Congress’ intent 
behind the patent laws, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant used 
the improvement in the United States because the defendant only used the improvement 
“on the high seas, and in other places out of the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 
196.  The Court stated that making or selling the improvement in the United States would 
constitute infringement, but because the improvement was a sail component, “the vessel 
could hardly be said to use [the improvement] while she was at anchor in the port . . . .” 
Id. 
 26 Id. at 195.  The patent laws represented Congress’s power to regulate commerce and 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts.” Id. 
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solely “within the limits of the United States.”27  The construction 
of the patent laws preferred by the plaintiff would confer upon the 
patentee a power that could “seriously embarrass the commerce of 
the country with foreign nations.”28  The Court held that Congress 
did not contemplate nor intend this implication.29  Thus, the Court 
held that patentee rights did not extend to foreign vessels lawfully 
entering U.S. ports.30 
The Court found a presumption against extraterritorial effect 
because larger policy issues outweighed the rights of the 
patentee—policy issues such as international trade, the Executive’s 
power to negotiate trade treaties, and Congress’s lack of expressed 
intent to frustrate the Executive’s treaty-making power.31 
In 1915, in Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline 
Plow Co.,32 the Supreme Court held that a patentee could not 
recover damages for foreign sales of infringing grain drills made in 
the U.S. because the location of sales controlled liability and 
therefore sales in Canada were beyond the reach of U.S. patent 
law.33  Plaintiff held a patent for an improvement of a grain drill, 
and manufactured and sold grain drills with the improvement.34  
 
 27 Id. (describing rights of patent holders).  “[T]hese acts of Congress do not, and were 
not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States . . . .” Id. 
 28 Id. at 197.  Plaintiff’s construction of patent law would “confer . . . not only rights of 
property, but also political power, and enable [patentees] to embarrass the treaty-making 
power” of the Government and enable patentees to interfere with Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce. Id. 
 29 Id.  “We think these laws ought to be construed in the spirit in which they were 
made . . . and should not be strained by technical constructions to reach cases which 
Congress evidently could not have contemplated.” Id.  “[I]t is impossible to suppose that 
Congress in passing these laws could have intended to . . . enable [the patentee] to 
exercise political power . . . .” Id. at 198.  The Court also opined whether Congress could 
empower an individual to impair the powers of either the legislative or executive 
branches. Id. 
 30 Id. at 198 (stating holding).  The Court added “that the use of such improvement . . . 
while she is coming into or going out of a port of the United States, is not an 
infringement . . . provided it was placed upon her in a foreign port, and authorized by the 
laws of the country to which she belongs.” Id. at 198–99. 
 31 See id. at 198. 
 32 235 U.S. 641 (1915). 
 33 Id. at 650 (stating that plaintiff could not add Canadian sales to calculation of 
damages).  The defendant did not make the drills. Id. 
 34 Id. at 642–43 (stating facts).  The patent pertained to improvements on commonly 
used grain drills called “shoe-drills.” Id. 
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Defendant, a wholesaler of agricultural implements, purchased and 
resold drills in the U.S. and Canada “embodying substantially the 
same improvements.”35  The trial court enjoined defendant from 
any further sales and awarded plaintiff nominal damages, which 
the court of appeals affirmed.36 
The Supreme Court held that plaintiff could not recover any 
profits or damages of drills sold in Canada because the patent only 
conferred on the plaintiff rights “confined to the United States and 
its Territories . . . .”37  The Court added that infringement “cannot 
be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”38  The 
Court distinguished an earlier case finding liability for foreign 
sales because here, the defendant did not make the infringing 
drills.39 
B. Infringement as a Factor in Determining Extraterritorial Effect 
Courts often evaluate the type of infringement when 
determining whether to give extraterritorial effect to U.S. patent 
law.  In 1952, Congress enacted Title 35 of the United States Code, 
which is the basis for current U.S. patent law.40  35 U.S.C. § 271 
 
 35 Id.  Manufacturer of infringing drills settled with plaintiff prior to this case. Id.  
Interestingly, although the Court held the plaintiff deserved more than nominal damages, 
the Court agreed with the lower courts’ justification for ruling that the defendant did not 
willfully infringe the patent because the patent at issue was not for a “new and operative 
grain-drill, but only for particular improvements in a type of grain-drill then in use and 
well known.” Id. at 644–45 (emphasis added). 
 36 Id. at 643 (stating procedural history).  The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
award of nominal damages because: 1) the patent was an improvement of a common 
drill; 2) marketability of the drill did not depend on the improvement; 3) plaintiff did not 
show defendant’s profits resulted from the improvement; and 4) plaintiff did not show 
other data essential to assessing damages sustained from the infringement. Id. at 643–44. 
 37 Id. at 650 (stating scope of patent holder rights).  The Court remanded the case for 
more factual findings to determine a reasonable approximation of damages because the 
defendant sold over 2500 drills, and “[t]he patent was valid and the invention 
meritorious.” Id. at 650–51 (describing why plaintiff was entitled to more than nominal 
damages). 
 38 Id. at 650. 
 39 Id. (citing Goulds’ Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253 (1881)) (discussing that the 
defendant manufactured the infringing products in the United States). 
 40 See Patent Laws, Excerpted from General Information Concerning Patents print 
brochure, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/laws.htm (last visited Jan. 
12, 2007). 
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defines infringement.41  Some provisions of § 271 define direct 
infringement and other provisions of the statute define indirect 
infringement.42  Some provisions of § 271 explicitly provide for 
extraterritorial effect, while other provisions of the statute remain 
exclusive to acts occurring within the United States.43  In addition 
to § 271, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) provides 
another forum for redress to plaintiffs who suffer damages from 
the importation of infringing goods.44 
Direct infringement is defined by §§ 271(a), 271(f), and 
271(g).45  Section 271(a) pertains to actual infringement done 
within the U.S.46  Section 271(f) pertains to exportation of goods 
for infringement outside the U.S.47  Section 271(g) pertains to 
importation of goods made by patented processes.48  This Note will 
focus on the Federal Circuit’s recent interpretations of §§ 271(a) 
and 271(f), however brief discussions of other sections are 
provided. 
1. Section 271(a) 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) addresses direct infringement and does not 
have any explicit extraterritorial reach.  Section 271(a) defines 
infringement as the following actions done without authority: 
“mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented 
invention, within the United States or import[ing] into the United 
 
 41 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 42 Id.  Sections 271(a), 271(f), and 271(g) prohibit direct infringement. Id. §§ 271 (a), 
(f), (g).  Sections 271(b) and 271(c) prohibit indirect infringement. Id. §§ 271 (b), (c).  
Indirect infringement includes induced and contributory infringement. Id. 
 43 Sections 271(f) pertains to active supplying of goods outside the U.S.  Section 271(g) 
pertains to importation of goods made outside the U.S., but the method of manufacture 
(outside the U.S.) was with a patented process. Id. §§ 271 (f), (g).  Section 271(a) has no 
express extraterritorial effect. Id. § 271(a). 
 44 Anne Elise Herold Li, Note, Is the Federal Circuit Affecting U.S. Treaties?  The ITC, 
§ 271(g), GATT/TRIPS & the Kinik Decision, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 601, 611 (2006).  For discussion on ITC, see infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 45 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), (f), (g) (2000). 
 46 Id. § 271(a) (stating infringer “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells . . . within the 
United States . . . .”). 
 47 Id. § 271(f) (stating infringer “supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United 
States . . . .”). 
 48 Id. § 271(g) (stating infringer “imports into the United States . . . a product . . . made 
by a process patented in the United States . . . .”). 
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States . . . .”49  The principal limitation of § 271(a) is territoriality.  
Section 271(a) clearly requires that the listed activities occur 
within the United States.  The difficult issue for courts to determine 
is whether an activity is actually within the United States.50  For 
example, the Federal Circuit has approached the “use” prong of 
§ 271(a)51 with two distinct analyses: (1) user-oriented analysis, 
and (2) control-oriented analysis.52  The user-oriented analysis 
focuses on whether the alleged infringer used the patented 
invention within the United States.53  The control-oriented analysis 
focuses on whether the infringer controlled the patented invention 
from within the United States.54 
a) User-Oriented Analysis 
The following cases highlight the user-oriented analysis of 
§ 271(a) by focusing on the situs of “use” or manufacture.  The 
cases are also important for their analysis of combination patents.55  
In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,56 the Supreme Court 
did not consider making and exporting components of a 
combination invention territorial subject matter because the 
defendant did not make nor use the claimed invention within the 
United States under § 271(a).57  The defendant manufactured and 
 
 49 Id. § 271(a). 
 50 See Yar Chaikovsky, Globalization, Technology without Boundaries & the Scope of 
U.S. Patent Law, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95, 99 (2005). 
 51 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  Other prongs of § 271(a) include: making, offering to 
sell, selling, and importing. See id. 
 52 See Chaikovsky, supra note 50, at 98–99. 
 53 See id. at 99.  The user-oriented analysis flows from the Supreme Court analysis in 
Deepsouth, a case that dealt with the export of components of a product. See id. 
 54 See id.  The control-oriented analysis flows from a series of lower court cases that 
dealt with subject matter that extended beyond U.S. borders such as international radar 
systems. See id. 
 55 Combination patents are patents that cover an operable machine or assembly.  
Combination patents do not protect individual components used to make the operable 
machine or assembly, unless the components are combined to make the operable machine 
or assembly. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 56 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 57 Id. at 527–28 (stating holding).  The Court held making and exporting components 
for a shrimp deveining machine did not infringe the plaintiff’s patent because the 
combination patent only covered the operational whole assembly and not the individual 
components. Id. at 528. 
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exported components for a shrimp deveining machine.58  If final 
assembly occurred within the United States (i.e., the components 
combined), the product would have infringed the plaintiff’s 
patent.59  Nevertheless, the district court held that “making,” under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a), in the context of combination patents did not 
include mere manufacture of components.60  The district court 
refused to enjoin Deepsouth Packing (“Deepsouth”) from 
exporting such components.61  The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower 
court.62  In doing so, the Fifth Circuit departed from other Circuits’ 
precedents by following the spirit of the Patent Act and capturing 
conduct purely conceived to circumvent U.S. patent law.63 
Although the Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Circuit’s 
intention,64 the Supreme Court confined plaintiff’s rights to those 
sprouting from the patent statute.65  The Court emphasized that 
 
 58 Id. at 523 (stating facts). 
 59 Id. (stating facts).  Defendant, Deepsouth, did not dispute infringement for making 
and selling completed deveiners in the United States, nor did Deepsouth dispute damages 
or injunction against further manufacturing and sales of deveiners in the United States. 
See id. n.5.  Deepsouth requested modification of the injunction against exporting 
deveiner components to foreign costumers who intended to complete assembly outside 
the United States. Id. at 523–24.  The Court noted that plaintiff’s invention included a 
“slitter” and “tumbler” both of which were combination patents, “‘[n]one of the parts 
referred to are new, and none are claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination 
less than the whole claimed as new . . . .  And this combination . . . is the thing 
patented.’” Id. at 520–21 (quoting Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet. 336, 341 (1842)). 
 60 See id. at 524–25 (stating district court ruling). 
 61 Id. at 525 (stating district court ruling).  Although combination may be predictable, 
the Court noted that “‘[i]t may be urged that . . . [this] result is not logical . . . . But it is 
founded on twin notions that underlie the patent laws.  One is that a combination patent 
protects only the combination.  The other is that monopolies . . . are not viewed with 
favor.’” Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 310 F. Supp. 926, 929 
(E.D. La. 1970)) 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id.  The Supreme Court relayed the sentiment behind the Fifth Circuit’s panel 
opinion: “[the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits] ‘worked themselves into . . . a 
conceptual box’ by adopting ‘an artificial, technical construction’ of the patent laws.” Id. 
(quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 443 F.2d 936, 938–39 (5th Cir. 
1971)). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 526 (describing 35 U.S.C. § 271 as the only source of authority that could give 
plaintiff a right to suppress Deepsouth from exporting deveiner components).  The Court 
dismissed a theory of contributory infringement because there was no evidence of direct 
infringement inside the United States. Id. (describing prerequisite for application of 
35 U.S.C. § 271(c)). 
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infringement, as defined by § 271(a), clearly did not include 
making or using a patented invention outside the United States.66  
Thus, the Court ruled that in order for plaintiff to recover, the 
plaintiff must show defendant made, used, or sold “the patented 
product within the bounds of this country.”67  Plaintiff argued that 
Deepsouth sold the patented invention, but the Court reduced the 
sales question to a manufacturing question.68  The Court held that 
Deepsouth did not manufacture the patented invention because “a 
combination patent protect[ed] only against the operable assembly 
of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts.”69  In support of 
its ruling to deny the plaintiff a right to suppress Deepsouth’s 
extraterritorial activity, the Court reiterated the essence of Brown 
v. Duchesne, “Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial 
effect . . . and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to 
such control over our markets.”70 
Congress later passed § 271(f), making it an infringement to 
export components for completed assembly abroad.  For discussion 
on subsequent cases dealing with § 271(f) see infra Part I.B.2.  
Deepsouth is still the basis for interpreting combination patents.71 
 
 66 Id. at 527. 
 67 Id. (describing plaintiff’s burden for relief).  To prevail plaintiff must show direct 
infringement as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Id. 
 68 Id. (describing that manufacture was a necessary preceding step to selling the 
invention).  The Court asked, “did Deepsouth ‘make’ (and then sell) something 
cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it ‘make’ (and then sell) 
something that fell short of infringement?” Id. 
 69 Id. at 528.  The Court dismissed the Fifth Circuit’s view that “‘substantial 
manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine’ constitute[d] direct 
infringement . . . .” Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 443 F.2d 936, 
938–39 (5th Cir. 1971)).  The dissent criticized the majority opinion for constructing 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) too narrowly and such a narrow construction would unfairly “reward 
the artful competitor . . . .” Id. at 532–33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 70 Id. at 531 (describing presumption against extraterritorial effect and suggesting that 
appropriate route to patent protection in other countries is through acquisition of patents 
in those countries) (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (citations 
omitted)). 
 71 See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“‘No 
wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed.  His monopoly does not 
cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements . . . to form the invention.’” (quoting 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972))). 
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In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp.,72 the Federal 
Circuit did not consider testing components of a combination 
patent territorial subject matter because the defendant did not test 
nor use the claimed combination invention within the United 
States, under § 271(a).73  The defendant tested components of a 
battery testing system within the United States and exported such 
components to Mexico, but never used the entire system within the 
United States.74  The plaintiff’s patent claimed the system and 
method of using the system.75  The district court granted summary 
judgment for defendant.76 
The Federal Circuit, citing Deepsouth, distinguished “use” of 
components from “use” of a combination invention comprising 
those components.77  The court stated that although testing 
components constituted use of those components under § 271(a), 
the plaintiff did not claim the components rather the plaintiff 
claimed the entire combined system.78  Thus, the court held the 
defendant did not use the claimed invention, under § 271(a).79  
However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings on 
§ 271(f).80 
b) Control-Oriented Analysis 
The following cases highlight the control-oriented analysis of 
§ 271(a) by focusing on the situs of “control” over the invention.  
In Decca Ltd. v. United States,81 the Court of Claims considered a 
 
 72 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The court affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and 
remanded a lower court ruling. Id. at 1365.  The court affirmed on the § 271(a) issue, but 
remanded on the § 271(f) issue. Id. 
 73 Id. at 1366–67.  The Federal Circuit held that testing components of a combination 
invention within the United States did not constitute “use,” under § 271(a), of the claimed 
combination invention. Id. 
 74 Id. at 1365–66. 
 75 Id. at 1365 (stating that the system monitors and warns operator when battery 
capacity falls below an acceptable capacity). 
 76 Id. at 1365–66. 
 77 Id. at 1366. 
 78 Id. at 1366–67. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1368–69.  For discussion on the court’s analysis of § 271(f), see infra 
Part I.B.2. 
 81 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
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transnational navigation system territorial subject matter because 
the U.S. Government used the invention within the United States, 
under § 271(a).82  The Government set up a navigation system with 
three broadcast stations located in Hawaii, North Dakota, and 
Norway.83  The plaintiff’s patent covered a system that included 
broadcasting, receiving, and analyzing signals to identify the 
location of ships and aircraft.84  The lower court determined the 
location of “use,” under § 271(a), by analyzing the locations of 
control and beneficial use, thus forming the basis for “control-
oriented” analysis.85  The court held that the Government infringed 
plaintiff’s patent because the control point was within, and benefits 
went to, the United States.86 
The Court of Claims endorsed the lower court’s control point 
and beneficial use analysis.87  The court emphasized that an 
invention that “cannot be confined to one country” should not be 
“without any territoriality merely because it operate[d] in more 
than one country, and at sea.”88  The court considered the home 
territory of the invention as the place where the invention was 
controlled.89  The court noted that the Government controlled and 
monitored the navigation system from within the United States, as 
well as synchronized all stations to master stations located within 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1081. 
 84 Id. at 1077, 1083.  The lower court emphasized that the patent focused on reception 
of signals and not generation of signals.  The lower court stated that had the scenario 
been different, e.g., the patent covered generation of the signals, then the Norwegian 
station would have been beyond reach of U.S. patent law. Id.  See also Chaikovsky, supra 
note 50, at 99–100. 
 85 Id. at 1082–83.  The lower court emphasized that its ruling rested on the 
“combination of circumstances” and not “any one factor.” Id. at 1083.  The lower court 
also emphasized that the benefit of the system was within the United States because the 
Government owned all the components of the navigation system. Id. 
 86 Id. (stating lower court holding). 
 87 See id. at 1075.  In recognition of the lower court’s opinion, the Court of Claims 
added to its opinion the entire lower court opinion. Id. at 1075–98. 
 88 Id. at 1074. 
 89 See id.  “[T]he location of the whole for purposes of the United States Patent Law is 
where the ‘master’ station or stations are, which is in the United States of America. . . .” 
Id. 
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the United States.90  The court held that the location of control for 
the navigation system was within the U.S., and thus the navigation 
system was territorial subject matter, under § 271(a).91  The Court 
of Claims left open the question of whether there is a legal fiction 
that cloaked United States flagged ships at sea with territoriality 
for purposes of U.S. patent law.92 
The next case established that even though an essential 
component is located in the United States that fact alone is 
insufficient to establish territoriality.93  In Freedom Wireless, Inc. 
v. Boston Communications Group, Inc.,94 the District Court of 
Massachusetts did not consider a transnational system territorial 
subject matter because the defendant did not use the invention 
within the United States, under § 271(a).95  Defendant Rogers 
Wireless (“Rogers”), a Canadian wireless phone service, 
contracted with codefendant Boston Communications Group 
(“BCG”), a U.S. company, to provide certain prepaid billing 
services.96  Although all of Rogers’ customers, receiving towers, 
 
 90 Id.  “[D]efendant established through the use of atomic clocks . . . the necessary 
synchronization of that station and part of that activity occurred in this country.  Further, 
it is from the United States all actions are taken to ensure synchronizations of the 
transmissions of that station with those in the United States.” Id. at 1082–83. 
 91 Id.  The Court of Claims agreed with the analysis in Rosen v. NASA, in which the 
Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences found that a space satellite system was 
reduced to practice inside the United States because the satellite was controlled from 
inside the U.S. Id. at 1074 (citing 152 U.S.P.Q. 757 (BNA) (Ct. Cl. 1966)).  The lower 
court also distinguished Deepsouth because use of the completed shrimp deveining 
invention occurred outside the U.S., unlike the navigation system that the Government 
used and benefited from. Id. at 1081. 
 92 See id. at 1072–73.  The Court of Claims rejected the lower court’s analysis that 
found territoriality on ships and aircraft that flew the U.S. flag because it was debatable 
theory. Id. 
 93 See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11 
(D. Mass. 2002). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 18.  The court held the defendant did not use the infringing wireless phone 
service within the United States, as required by § 271(a), because the control point of the 
service was outside the United States. Id. 
 96 Id. at 13.  BCG provided Rogers with the technology required to implement prepaid 
calling services. Id.  When a prepaid customer attempted to place a call, certain 
information, including caller identity and location, was transmitted to BCG’s system and 
routed through its database, “which had current information relating to the caller’s 
prepaid account balance . . . .” Id. at 13–14.  The system “determine[d] the cost of the 
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and phone switches, as well as most of BCG network nodes, were 
located in Canada, BCG’s main database was located in the U.S.97  
Plaintiff patentee sued Rogers and BCG, among others, for 
infringement of its prepaid billing service.98  Rogers moved for 
summary judgment, asserting that the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction and that Rogers did not use the patented invention 
within the United States as required by § 271(a).99 
The district court began its analysis with the requirements for 
infringement—Rogers must have “made, used, offered to sell, or 
sold a patented invention within the United States.”100  The 
plaintiff asserted that Rogers relied on BCG’s database, which was 
located within the U.S., and thus Rogers used the patented 
invention within the U.S.101  The court inquired whether Rogers’ 
use of the BCG database in the U.S. constituted “use” within the 
United States.102  The court noted two cases that dealt with 
transnational systems and reached different territorial conclusions.  
In Decca, the Court of Claims held that a transnational navigation 
system satisfied the territoriality requirement of § 271(a) because 
the system was controlled from within the United States.103  On the 
other hand, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, the United 
States Court of Federal Claims held that a satellite system did not 
satisfy § 271(a) because the system was controlled from outside 
 
requested call, calculate[d] the maximum duration for the call, and sen[t] this information 
back” to Rogers’s network. Id. at 14. 
 97 Id. at 14. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 15 (describing requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).  The district court 
emphasized that the Federal Circuit has interpreted § 271(a) to exclude acts wholly done 
outside the United States. Id. (citing Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 
1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).  The district court also noted that the Supreme Court has held that 
rights of a patentee remain “confined to the United States and its territories.” Id. (citing 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)). 
 101 Id.  The plaintiff emphasized the essential nature of the BCG database to Rogers’ 
system. Id. 
 102 Id. at 15–16. 
 103 Id. at 16.  In Decca, the Court of Claims held that a global navigation system was 
used within the United States despite one broadcast station in Norway because the system 
was controlled from within the U.S. Id. (citing Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 
1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976)). 
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the United States.104  The court held that even though the BCG 
database was essential, it was not the control point for Rogers’ 
wireless phone system.105  Rather, Rogers controlled its system 
from within Canada, and therefore Rogers did not use the system 
within the United States.106 
2. Section 271(f) 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) also addresses direct infringement, but 
unlike § 271(a), it has explicit extraterritorial reach.  In 1984, in 
response to the Supreme Court ruling in Deepsouth, Congress 
enacted § 271(f).107  Section 271(f)(1) prohibits supplying goods to 
actively induce infringement outside the United States.108  Section 
271(f)(2) prohibits supplying goods with the knowledge and 
intention of infringement outside the Unites States.109  Thus, 
§ 271(f) expanded direct infringement to include exportation of 
 
 104 Id. at 16–17.  In Hughes, the court held that a satellite system was not used within the 
United States because the satellite never entered the U.S., no direct control of the satellite 
originated in the U.S., and the control point was outside the U.S. Id. (citing Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 20 Fed. Cl. 197, 242–43 (1993)).  The district court also 
noted that the Goddard Space Center, the only part of the satellite system in the United 
States, functioned merely as a communications relay link and not a control point. Id. at 17 
(citing Hughes, 20 Fed. Cl. at 243).  The U.S. Court of Federal Claims was created in 
1992 and is a successor of the original Court of Claims. 
 105 Id. at 17 (stating that although the BCG database was essential it did not direct, 
control, or monitor the wireless phone system). 
 106 Id. at 18.  The court also noted that Rogers’ wireless system “was a Canadian system 
that happened to extend into the United States, not a domestic system that happened to 
extend into Canada.” Id. 
 107 Pellegrini v. Analog Device, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 130 
Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)).  In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court held that exportation of 
components intended for combination abroad did not violate the combination patent 
covering the device because the completed device was not made or used within the U.S.  
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).  For discussion on 
Congress’s response to Deepsouth, see infra Part I.D. 
 108 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000).  “Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of components of a 
patented invention . . . to actively induce the combination of such components outside the 
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred 
within the United States . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
 109 Id. § 271(f)(2).  “Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or 
from the United States any component of a patented invention . . . knowing that such 
component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined 
outside the United States . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
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components inducing or intending combination of such 
components to make a patented invention outside the United 
States.110  The Federal Circuit has held that § 271(f) applies to 
supplying both tangible and intangible products.111  The Federal 
Circuit has also held that § 271(f) applies to device claims, but not 
process claims.112 
In Waymark Corp., the Federal Circuit considered exporting 
components of a combination invention territorial subject matter 
even though the invention was never completed because § 271(f) 
did not require actual combination.113  The defendant exported 
components but never completed assembly of the claimed 
invention.114  The lower court held defendant did not infringe 
under § 271(f) because defendant never made the invention and 
thus, “[t]here can be no contributory infringement [under 
§ 271(f)(2)] without the fact or intention of direct infringement.”115 
Focusing on the legislative history, the Federal Circuit found 
that “[Section] 271(f)(2) d[id] not incorporate the doctrine of 
contributory infringement” because § 271(f)(2) lacked specific 
language requiring it,116 and § 271(f)(2) only required intent to 
combine the components of an alleged infringing device.117  The 
court found that the legislative history behind § 271(f) did not 
show any language requiring actual combination.118  The Federal 
Circuit distinguished § 271(c), the statute for contributory 
 
 110 Both subsections require the alleged infringer to directly “suppl[y] or cause to be 
supplied” goods outside the U.S. Id. §§ 271(f)(1), 271(f)(2). 
 111 See Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117 (construing language of § 271(f) to mean actual 
components of an invention); Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 
1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing that intangible software code is a “component” of a 
computer product for purposes of § 271(f)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005). 
 112 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1322–24 (discussing that 
§ 271(f) does not apply to process claims), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). 
 113 Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  “The 
statute does not require actual assembly.” Id.  The court affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, 
and remanded a lower court ruling. Id. at 1365. 
 114 Id. at 1365. 
 115 Id. at 1367.  The lower court also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of 
§ 271(f)(2). Id.  Contributory infringement is a form of indirect infringement and covered 
by 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).  Indirect infringement is discussed infra Part I.B.4. 
 116 Id. at 1368. 
 117 Id. at 1367–68 (describing a facial inspection of the statutory language). 
 118 Id. at 1368. 
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infringement, from § 271(f) because § 271(c) contained language 
requiring proof of direct infringement.119  Thus, the court held 
§ 271(f)(2) did not require actual combination of physical 
components and remanded for further inquiry on whether 
defendant intended combination abroad.120 
In Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.,121 the Federal Circuit did 
not consider export of instructions for producing an invention 
abroad territorial subject matter because § 271(f) required that the 
components of the invention physically emanate from within the 
United States.122  Defendant Analog Devices, Inc. (“Analog”), a 
U.S. corporation, manufactured circuits exclusively outside the 
U.S. and sold most of these circuits to foreign customers.123  The 
plaintiff sued Analog for direct infringement and induced 
infringement.124  Analog filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment with respect to foreign sales.125  The district court, noting 
U.S. patent law did not have extraterritorial effect, granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Analog on the issue of foreign sales 
and the plaintiff appealed this ruling.126 
The Federal Circuit inquired whether § 271(f)(1) applied to 
“products manufactured outside the United States and never 
shipped to or from the United States.”127  Plaintiff asserted that 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 122 Id. at 1117 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)).  The court held that manufacturing 
directives sent from the United States did not constitute supplying the patented invention 
in or from the U.S., as required by § 271(f)(1). Id. 
 123 Id. at 1115 (stating facts). 
 124 Id. at 1114. 
 125 Id. at 1115. 
 126 Id. (discussing procedural history).  The district court rejected plaintiff’s assertion 
that since defendant’s headquarters were located in the United States and order 
instructions emanated from there, the chips should be considered to have been supplied 
from the U.S. Id. 
 127 Id. at 1116 (discussing defendant’s main argument).  The court also noted the 
significance of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), “[It] was enacted in the wake of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth in which the Court acknowledged that 
unauthorized manufacturers . . . could avoid liability . . . by manufacturing the unassembled 
components of those products in the United States and then shipping them outside the 
United States for assembly.  Congress enacted § 271(f) in order to close that loophole.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Analog supplied or caused to be supplied the infringing circuits, as 
required by § 271(f)(1), by controlling the production within the 
U.S. through accepting orders and relaying production instructions 
to all foreign manufacturing sites.128  First, the court focused on the 
clear meaning of § 271(f)(1) by stating it only applied to 
“components of a patent[ed] invention . . . physically present in the 
United States and then either sold or exported ‘in such a manner as 
to actively induce the combination . . . .’”129  Second, the court 
stated that § 271(f)(1) “focuse[d] on the location of the accused 
components, not the accused infringer.”130  Thus, the court held 
Analog was not liable under § 271(f)(1) for foreign sales because 
the components were never shipped from the United States and 
because sending instructions did not constitute physical shipment 
of components.131 
In Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,132 the Federal 
Circuit considered exporting software code territorial subject 
matter because § 271(f) included intangible inventions.133  The 
defendant, Microsoft, exported master disks with source code for 
its operating system to foreign computer manufacturers for 
purposes of copying code to computers for sale outside the United 
States.134  The plaintiff’s patent claimed a browser function that 
 
 128 Id.  Plaintiff listed other characteristics of control: “Analog is incorporated in the 
United States and has executive, marketing, and product line responsibilities for 
[infringing circuits]; that Analog conceived and designed the [infringing circuits]; . . . and 
that Analog receives purchase orders from and invoices customers worldwide for 
[infringing circuits] and increases production levels for [infringing circuits] in response to 
those purchase orders.” Id. 
 129 Id. at 1117 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)). 
 130 Id. (noting precedent).  In North American Philips v. American Vending Sales, Inc., 
the Federal Circuit held that infringement occurred where the infringing act “‘[was] 
committed and not where the injury [was] felt.’” Id.  (quoting 35 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 131 Id. at 1117–18 (stating holding).  The court also emphasized that “‘the right 
conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its territories, 
and infringement of this right cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign 
country.’” Id. at 1119.  (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 
641, 650 (1915)). 
 132 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005). 
 133 Id. at 1339.  The court held § 271(f) included software code on a master disk because 
271(f) encompassed “every form of invention eligible for patenting . . . .” Id. 
 134 Id. at 1331. 
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defendant’s operating system allegedly infringed.135  The district 
court determined “source code is the legal equivalent of a piece of 
computer hardware and that ‘in a legal sense, a[sic] source code is 
a made part of a computer product.’”136  Therefore, the district 
court considered source code a “component” for the purposes of 
§ 271(f).137 
The Federal Circuit treated intangible inventions, under 
§ 271(f), no differently than structural inventions.138  The court 
rejected the defendant’s assertion that Congress intended 
“components,” under § 271(f), to mean “physical components” as 
used in Deepsouth because the legislative intent behind § 271(f) 
was to close loopholes, not preserve them.139  Relying on the 
legislative history, the court held that the language of § 271(f) did 
not require components of a patented invention be tangible.140  
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
“components,” under § 271(f) included software code.141 
In NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion,142 the Federal Circuit did 
not consider a transnational process territorial subject matter 
because § 271(f) did not apply to process inventions.143  The 
legislative history behind § 271(f) supported the court’s assertion 
 
 135 Id. at 1328. 
 136 Id. at 1331–32. 
 137 Id. at 1332.  The Federal Circuit reiterated the lower court’s statement that, for legal 
purposes, in the field of computer technology the terms “software” and “hardware” are 
used interchangeably. Id. at 1339. 
 138 Id. at 1339.  The Federal Circuit emphasized that it was sound policy to counsel 
“against varying the definition of ‘component of a patented invention’ according to the 
particular form of the part under consideration. . . .” Id. at 1339–40. 
 139 Id. at 1340.  Microsoft asserted that because 271(f) was Congress’ response to 
Deepsouth, the language in 271(f) should be narrowly confined to the situation in 
Deepsouth, for example, the export of physical components. Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1341.  On October 31, 2005, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Order List: 
546 U.S. (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/ 
courtorders/103105pzor.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
 142 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 143 Id. at 1322–23.  Since the court found infringement for the method claims under 
§ 271(a), the court did not consider the method claims under § 271(f). Id. at 1321.  For 
discussion on facts of the case, see infra Part II.A.1. 
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that Congress did not focus on process claims.144  The court 
refused to equate the sale of handheld devices to supplying 
“components of a patented invention” for purposes of § 271(f) 
because a user did not combine the “components” to complete a 
patented process outside the United States.145  Thus, the court held 
§ 271(f) did not apply to process claims.146 
3. Section 271(g) 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) also addresses direct infringement and has 
explicit extraterritorial reach.  In 1988, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act added § 271(g).147  Section 271(g) prohibits 
unauthorized importation, use, selling or offering to sell “within 
the United States a product which is made by a process patented in 
the United States . . . .”148  Thus, § 271(g) provides patent 
protection to patent holders of a process by disallowing would-be 
infringers from conducting the process outside the U.S. and then 
importing the goods resulting from the process.149 
 
 144 Id. at 1322 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 3, 6 (1984) and 130 Cong. Rec. 28, 069 
(1984)).  As stated earlier, Congress enacted 271(f) in response to Deepsouth, which 
involved a combination patent and not a process patent. Id. 
 145 Id.  “While it is difficult to conceive of how one might supply . . . a substantial 
portion of the steps of a patented method . . . it is clear that RIM’s supply of the 
BlackBerry handheld devices and [related] products to its customers in the United States 
is not the statutory ‘supply’ of any ‘component’ steps for combination into NTP’s 
patented methods.” Id. 
 146 Id. at 1322–23. 
 147 See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(discussing legislative history behind 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)).  The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act was the result of a policy trend started in the 1970’s to increase 
America’s competitiveness in the global economy. See Kent H. Hughes, Facing the 
Global Competitiveness Challenge, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECH. ONLINE, 
http://www.issues.org/21.4/hughes.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
 148 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).  “Whoever without authority imports into the United 
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by 
a process patented in the United States . . . .” Id. 
 149 Because of cheaper labor costs overseas, without any laws to prohibit him, a would-
be infringer could conduct a process overseas and import the results of the process and 
sell the goods more cheaply and undercut the value of the patent holder’s process patent, 
let alone circumvent the exclusive right of the patent all together. 
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Section 271(g) only applies to tangible products.150  The 
Federal Circuit has interpreted “made,” in § 271(g), to mean 
“manufactured.”151  Liability only attaches if the process directly 
manufactured the product.152  Mere predicate processes to identify 
the product are insufficient for liability.153  Determination of 
whether a product was “made by” a patented process to satisfy 
§ 271(g) is a judicial question.154  Alternatively, with respect to 
imported products a patentee can seek redress from the 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).155 
In Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,156 the Federal 
Circuit did not consider importation of a drug identified by a 
patented process territorial subject matter because the patented 
process did not make the imported drug under § 271(g).157  
Defendant Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Housey”) held patents 
for “a method of screening” substances.158  Bayer AG (“Bayer”) 
sought a declaratory judgment against Housey for patent invalidity, 
unenforceability, and non-infringement.159  In its counterclaim of 
infringement, Housey alleged Bayer used the patented screening 
process to identify the pharmacological properties of Bayer’s 
drug.160  The district court dismissed Housey’s counterclaim of 
infringement for failure to state a claim and Housey appealed.161 
The Federal Circuit inquired whether “made,” as used in 
§ 271(g), meant “manufactured.”162  The court examined other 
 
 150 See Bayer AG, 340 F.3d at 1377 (holding that § 271(g) only applies to tangible 
articles of manufacture). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. (discussing Congress’s intention for courts to decide proximity question on a 
“case-by-case basis”). 
 155 For discussion of ITC, see infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 156 See 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 157 Id. at 1377–78 (stating that importation of a drug identified by a patented process 
was not manufactured by a patented process, as required by § 271(g), because the process 
merely produced information regarding the drug and not the drug itself). 
 158 Id. at 1369. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 1370. 
 162 Id. at 1371–72 (describing disputed statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)).  
Housey conceded that if “made” meant “manufactured,” then Bayer’s proposition would 
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provisions of the patent statute to resolve the meaning of the term 
“made.”163  One provision described a person who used “a 
patented process to ‘produce’ a product as a ‘manufacturer.’”164  
Another provision described a person who made a product as “a 
person then engaged in the manufacture of a product . . . .”165  The 
court noted that the statutory exceptions within § 271(g) connoted 
a physical structure because practically speaking only physical 
structures can be “materially changed,” or “become a trivial or 
nonessential component of another product . . . .”166  The court 
noted that Congress enacted § 271(g) to supplement remedies 
provided for by the ITC against importation of goods made abroad 
by patented processes,167 which Congress considered inadequate 
for owners of process patents.168  The legislative history suggested 
that Congress was only concerned with “articles” produced from 
processes.169  Thus, the court held “made” meant “manufactured” 
and production of information, for screening purposes or 
otherwise, was not covered by § 271(g).170 
In NTP, the Federal Circuit did not consider a transnational 
method territorial subject matter because § 271(g) did not apply to 
process inventions.171  The court, relying on Bayer, held § 271(g) 
 
be correct that “information is not a manufactured product” and thus § 271(g) would not 
be applicable. Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 1372 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000)) (describing statutory 
language in similar section of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which 
enacted § 271(g)). 
 165 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(4)(A) (2000)). 
 166 Id. at 1372–73 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(1) (2000)) (Section 271(g) provides the 
following exceptions for a product made by a patented process if “(1) it is materially 
changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component 
of another product”). 
 167 Id. at 1373 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000)). 
 168 Id. at 1373–74 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-60 at 8–9). 
 169 Id. at 1374.  A proposed precursor of § 271(g) contained language declaring 
infringement as importation of “‘a product manufactured by a patented process.’” Id. 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 98-663 at 30 (1984)) (emphasis in original). 
 170 Id. at 1377 (stating holding). 
 171 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The 
court probably did not analyze the system claims under § 271(g), for the same reason it 
did not analyze the system claims under § 271(f).  For discussion on facts of the case, see 
infra Part II.A.1. 
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did not apply to production of intangible items.172  The court noted 
that “transmission of information” like the “production of 
information,” at issue in Bayer, did not constitute a tangible result 
and therefore § 271(g) is inapplicable to plaintiff’s process 
claim.173  Since the process claim merely transmitted information it 
did not produce tangible results, thus § 271(g) did not apply to the 
asserted process claim.174 
a) International Trade Commission 
Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act,175 defined unfair methods 
of competition in importation as: 
The importation into the United States, the sale for 
importation, or the sale within the United States after 
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of 
articles that—(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United 
States patent . . . or (ii) are made, produced, processed, or 
mined under, or by means of, a process covered by the 
claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.176 
The ITC investigates violations of § 337.177  The ITC conducts 
proceedings that complement federal judicial proceedings.178  
Although the ITC cannot award damages, the ITC can issue 
temporary or permanent exclusion orders, which are comparable to 
a preliminary or permanent injunction from a federal district 
court.179  The primary purpose of either an injunction or an 
exclusion order is to stop the continued infringement of the patent 
holder’s patent.  The Federal Circuit has recognized that § 337 may 
have wider scope regarding tangible articles than § 271(g), but 
 
 172 Id. at 1323. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). 
 176 Id. at (a)(1)(B). 
 177 Bryan Farney, An Overview of Section 337 Actions in the ITC, Part I, 
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Aug/17/128707.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
 178 See Li, supra note 44, at 611. 
 179 Farney, supra note 177; see also Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)).  “Congress 
recognized the availability of redress from the ITC, but noted that the remedies available 
thereunder were insufficient to fully protect the owners of process patents.” Id. 
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Congress believed § 337 did not provide enough protection for 
owners of process patents.180 
Section 337 is limited to infringement through importation.181  
The major benefit to the ITC is speed—actions proceeding through 
the ITC are quicker than actions proceeding through federal district 
court.182  The major limitation of an ITC proceeding is 
uncertainty—the ITC retains discretion to conduct an investigation, 
therefore a litigant’s grievance may not be heard.183  If the ITC 
accepts the complaint, the ITC gives the case to an Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”) to conduct discovery and issue a ruling.184  
The ITC also has discretion regarding whether or not to review the 
ALJ ruling.185  The President of the United States can also veto an 
ITC ruling for policy reasons.186 
Parties can request a rehearing with the ITC or appeal an ITC 
ruling in the Federal Circuit.187  A difference which may play a 
crucial role in a litigant’s decision to pursue an ITC proceeding is 
that the ITC has nationwide in rem jurisdiction, rather than the 
mere in personam jurisdiction of a federal district court.188  In rem 
jurisdiction is preferable to in personam jurisdiction in patent 
infringement cases because often times the patent holder merely 
wishes to stop the infringement and in rem jurisdiction pertains to 
the actual imported goods, while in personam jurisdiction requires 
service upon the actual importers and infringers which is more 
 
 180 Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374 (stating that “Congress recognized the availability of redress 
from the ITC, but noted that the remedies available thereunder were insufficient to fully 
protect the owners of process patents.”). 
 181 See Farney, supra note 177. 
 182 Id.  See also Li, supra note 44, at 611 (stating that speed is a “key feature” of ITC 
proceedings). 
 183 See Farney, supra note 177 (comparing ITC proceedings to the automatic review of 
complaints filed with the district court). 
 184 Id. § II. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Li, supra note 44, at 616; Farney, supra note 177, § II.J.1.  Although rarely used, 
President Reagan vetoed an exclusion order that he believed would unfavorably affect too 
many people and the computer trade industry. Farney, supra note 177, § II.J.1. 
 187 Farney, supra note 177, § II.K (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1994)).  “The appeal 
must take place within sixty days of the end of the time allotted for presidential review.” 
Li, supra note 44, at 616. 
 188 See Farney, supra note 177, § II.M.1. 
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costly and time-consuming.189  This difference is also beneficial in 
that it precludes would-be importers from reconstituting their 
companies to circumvent in personam court orders.190 
4. Indirect Infringement 
In addition to §§ 271(a), 271(f), and 271(g), which prohibit 
direct infringement or overt acts constituting infringement, 
§§ 271(b) and 271(c) prohibit indirect infringement.  Section 
271(b) prohibits the active inducement of infringement.191  Section 
271(c) prohibits contributory infringement: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or 
imports into the United States a component . . . knowing 
[that the component is] . . . especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of [a machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or process] patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer.192 
In other words, proffering a component suitable for nothing 
other than an infringing purpose is infringement according to 
§ 271(c).  For either section to have extraterritorial reach, a direct 
infringement must occur within the United States.193 
Contributory infringement, § 271(c), is broader in scope than 
§ 271(b).194  The language of § 271(c) states, “[w]hoever offers to 
 
 189 See Li, supra note 44, at 612 (discussing the advantages of the ITC having in rem 
jurisdiction in addition to in personam jurisdiction). 
 190 See id. (discussing the difficulty of getting in personam jurisdiction over foreign 
importers that do not “reside” or have “minimum contacts” within any jurisdiction); 
Farney, supra note 177, § II.M.1 (discussing the practice of importing infringing articles 
through an unnamed company). 
 191 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).  “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall 
be liable as an infringer.” Id. 
 192 Id. § 271 (c). 
 193 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 257 
(2005) (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)).  Because indirect infringement requires direct infringement, this paper will 
focus on case law addressing direct infringement only. 
 194 See Donald Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: 
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 615.  In 1994, Congress amended 
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sell or sells . . . or imports . . . a component . . . .”195  An example 
of § 271(c)’s broad scope can be seen by the following 
hypothetical.196  A patent covers the combination of components A 
and B.  Defendant then sells B to consumers and consumers 
combine B with A.  Consumers consummate the direct 
infringement.197  It is not feasible to sue the consumers, but the 
patent holder can sue the defendant for contributory 
infringement.198  A limitation on contributory infringement is that 
it requires knowledge and willfulness, which are not requirements 
for direct infringement.199 
C. Claim Type as a Factor for Determining Extraterritorial Effect 
Courts often evaluate the form of patent claim being infringed 
when determining whether to give extraterritorial effect to U.S. 
patent law.  Utility patents provide four different types of claims: 
“process, machine, manufacture, or compositions of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”200  The type of claim 
can determine whether a court will consider the invention 
territorial subject matter.201  In a recent Federal Circuit case, the 
court reached different conclusions on territoriality after analyzing 
the patentee’s system claims and process claims.202 
 
§ 271(c) to expand its territorial scope by adding the language, “offers to sell or sells . . . 
or imports . . . .” Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996)). 
 195 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 196 Chisum, supra note 194, at 615. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id.  The patent holder must apply the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant. See id. 
 199 Id. at 616. 
 200 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  In addition to the four statutory categories of claim types an 
inventor may also claim a product by describing the process used to create the product, 
called “product-by-process” claim which is a creature of the Patent Office and the courts. 
Gregory S. Maskel, Note, Product-by-Process Patent Claim Construction: Resolving the 
Federal Circuit’s Conflicting Precedent, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
115, 117 (2006). 
 201 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006).  “Not only will the analysis [of extraterritoriality] 
differ for different types of infringing acts, it will also differ as the result of differences 
between different types of claims.” Id. 
 202 See id. at 1317 (describing different conclusions for § 271(a) analysis regarding 
system claims and method claims). 
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In NTP, the Federal Circuit distinguished the impact of 
§ 271(a) on system claims and process claims.203  At issue was the 
Blackberry e-mail system, which included components located in 
Canada.204  The court held that for purposes of “use,” under 
§ 271(a), plaintiff’s system claims encompassed the Blackberry 
system, but plaintiff’s method claims did not encompass the 
Blackberry method.205  A sample of the plaintiff’s system claims is 
claim 150 from U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 (“the ’592 patent”): 
150. In a communication system comprising a wireless 
system which communication system transmits electronic 
mail inputted to the communication system from an 
originating device . . . and after reception of the electronic 
mail by the destination processor, information contained in 
the electronic mail and an identification of a wireless 
device in the wireless system are transmitted by the 
wireless system to the wireless device and from the 
wireless device to one of the mobile processors, the 
wireless device and one mobile processor . . . .206 
A sample of plaintiff’s process claims is claim 311 of U.S. 
Patents No. 6,067,451 (“the ’451 patent”).207 
311. A method of transmitting and distributing inputted 
information through a distributed system, comprising: 
originating electronic mail from a processor in a 
communication system which electronic mail includes 
(a) an address of an interface . . . (b) an identification of a 
RF receiver in the RF system to receive the inputted 
information, and (c) the inputted information to be 
delivered to the RF receiver; receiving the originated 
electronic mail . . . ; adding information to the inputted 
 
 203 See id. at 1317–18. 
 204 Id. at 1287–90 (describing Blackberry system). 
 205 Id. at 1317–18. 
 206 U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 claim 150 (filed Dec. 6, 1999). 
 207 One of the disputed process claims in NTP was claim 313. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1291. 
However, claim 313 is a dependent claim. See U.S. Patent No. 6,067,451 claim 313 (filed 
Sep. 28, 1998).  “A method in accordance with claim 311 wherein . . . .” Id.  For purposes 
of contrasting the language of system and process claims, the author has chosen to 
produce the independent claim upon which claim 313 depends, claim 311. Id. 
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information and the identification of the at least one 
designated RF receiver . . . ; broadcasting the inputted 
information and the identification of the RF receiver . . . ; 
receiving the broadcasted inputted information and the 
identification of the RF receiver with the RF receiver; and 
storing the received inputted broadcast information in a 
memory and processing the information stored in the 
memory . . . .208 
The court’s decision to apply different extraterritorial character 
to the plaintiff’s different types of claims turned on the difference 
between using a device and using a process “within the United 
States,” as required by § 271(a).209  The Federal Circuit noted that 
a process is nothing more than a series of steps.210  To use a 
process “within the United States,” an alleged infringer must 
complete every step of the patented process “within the United 
States.”211  Thus, the Federal Circuit seemingly gave 
extraterritorial effect to the plaintiff’s system claims and not its 
method claims because the court distinguished between “use” of a 
system and “use” of a process.  Rather than merely extending 
protection capriciously, the court expanded or contracted its notion 
of territorial subject matter based on the type of claim. 
D. Interplay between the Courts and Congress 
Congress has legislated changes to the Patent Act when it 
disagreed with a Supreme Court interpretation of the Patent Act or 
when a case illuminated a loophole in the Patent Act.  For 
example, § 271(f) was Congress’s response to a loophole in the 
patent laws at the time of Deepsouth.212  In Deepsouth, the 
Supreme Court strictly interpreted § 271(a) and refused to give the 
 
 208 U.S. Patent No. 6,067,451 claim 311 (filed Sep. 28, 1998). 
 209 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317–18.  (“[T]he distinction between a claim to a product, device, 
or apparatus, all of which are tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a 
series of acts or steps. . . . [A process] consists of doing something, and therefore has to 
be carried out or performed.” (quoting In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2002))). 
 210 Id. at 1318. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 
130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)). 
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statute extraterritorial effect.213  The Court held that the defendant 
who exported components and induced their combination outside 
the U.S. did not infringe the combination patent on the invention 
because the defendant did not make the invention within the 
U.S.214  In response to this ruling, Congress enacted § 271(f) which 
expanded the definition of infringement to include exportation of 
components with intent to complete assembly of a patented device 
outside the United States.215  Despite the enactment of § 271(f), 
Deepsouth is still the cited authority for interpreting combination 
patents.216 
Recently, the Federal Circuit addressed the scope of § 271(f).  
In 2004, the Federal Circuit held that instructions disseminated 
from defendant’s headquarters in the United States did not apply to 
§ 271(f) because the defendant did not export any physical 
components.217  In 2005, the Federal Circuit ruled against 
Microsoft in two cases holding that § 271(f) applied to exported 
software code used to make duplicates overseas.218 
E. Jurisdiction 
35 U.S.C. § 293 allows a plaintiff to bring suit in the District 
Court of the District of Columbia against a foreign, nonresident 
patentee.219  Section 293 stipulates that nonresident patentees may 
 
 213 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972).  “With all 
respect, this seems to me too narrow a reading of 35 U.S.C. § 154 and 271(a). . . . [T]he 
result is unduly to reward the artful competitor . . . .” Id. at 532–33 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 214 Id. at 528–29 (holding that a combination patent only covers the specified 
combination and not its individual components). 
 215 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“No 
wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed.  His monopoly does not 
cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements . . . to form the invention.” (quoting 
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 529)). 
 217 Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117–18. 
 218 Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 568 (2005); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
 219 See Chad A. Schiefelbein, Accepting an Exception to the “Government Contracts 
Exception” of the District of Columbia’s Long-Arm Statute, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 1023, 
1060–61. 
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designate “a person residing within the United States” to receive 
process or notice.220  Section 293 also provides: 
If the person designated cannot be found . . . or if no person 
has been designated, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons 
shall be served by publication or otherwise as the court 
directs. The court shall have the same jurisdiction to take 
any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder that it 
would have if the patentee were personally within the 
jurisdiction of the court.221 
Section 293 serves as a long-arm statute providing plaintiff’s at 
least one forum for relief.222 
II. DIVINING THE EDGES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 
As the global economy spreads and multinational companies 
continue to merge, borders become irrelevant, which will spur 
disputes over territorial subject matter for U.S. patent law.  Two 
cases exemplify the difficult task of defining the edges of 
extraterritorial reach while recognizing the Supreme Court’s 
maxim against extending extraterritorial effect to U.S. patent law.  
The NTP case is a unique example of the Federal Circuit 
seemingly injecting extraterritorial reach into § 271(a), yet not 
running afoul of the Supreme Court’s proscription because the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis focused on specific claim types.223  On 
the other hand, AT&T v. Microsoft224 is an example of the Federal 
Circuit actually injecting limitless extraterritorial reach into 
§ 271(f) and violating the Supreme Court proscription because the 
 
 220 35 U.S.C. § 293 (2000). 
 221 Id. 
 222 See Schiefelbein, supra note 219, at 1060–61. 
 223 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(discussing the impact of different infringing acts and claim types on analysis of 
§ 271(a)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). 
 224 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
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Federal Circuit’s analysis encompassed acts wholly done outside 
the U.S.225 
Part A of this section discusses NTP and the Federal Circuit’s 
two-factor analysis of § 271(a) problems, as well as the inherent 
differences between “use” of a process and “use” of a system.  Part 
B of this section discusses AT&T and its seemingly boundless 
approach to analyzing § 271(f) problems pertaining to intangible 
property. 
A. NTP v. Research In Motion 
In NTP, the Federal Circuit analyzed the claims surrounding 
the popular Blackberry wireless e-mail system, including patents 
containing process and system claims.226  The court did not 
consider a transnational process claim territorial subject matter 
because the defendant did not “use” the completed process 
invention within the United States, under § 271(a).227  However, 
the court considered the transnational system claim territorial 
subject matter because the defendant “used” the system invention 
within the United States, under § 271(a).228  Defendant Research In 
Motion (“RIM”), a Canadian corporation, set up a wireless e-mail 
system with a “relay” station located in Canada.229  Plaintiff owned 
 
 225 Id. at 1372–73 (Rader, J., dissenting).  See also Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline 
Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (stating that infringement “cannot be predicated of 
acts wholly done in a foreign country.”). 
 226 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1287–90 (describing Blackberry system). 
 227 Id. at 1318.  The court held that the processes integrated into the Blackberry wireless 
e-mail system were not “used” within the United States, under § 271(a), because not all 
of the steps in the processes were completed within the United States. Id.  The court 
analyzed infringement on two types of patent claims: process claims and system claims. 
Id. at 1287. 
 228 Id. at 1317.  The court held that Blackberry system was “used” within in the United 
States, under § 271(a), because Blackberry customers manipulated the handheld device in 
the U.S. Id. 
 229 Id. at 1290.  The Blackberry system is a “push” e-mail system which instantly 
delivers e-mail to recipients, rather than recipient having to initiate a connection to the 
server and “pull” e-mail messages from the server. Id. at 1287–88.  The system 
incorporates a desktop utility that receives e-mail addressed to user, connects via the 
internet to the relay station in Canada, and transmits the e-mail to the relay station. Id.  
The relay station wirelessly transmits the e-mail message to the user’s handheld device. 
Id.  When the user initiates an e-mail with the handheld device the e-mail message 
follows the reverse path. Id. 
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patents with process claims and systems claims covering the 
processes and systems employed by RIM and incorporated into the 
Blackberry e-mail system.230  The district court held RIM infringed 
both plaintiff’s process and system claims.231 
1. “Use” of a Process under § 271(a) 
The Federal Circuit evaluated RIM’s “use,” under § 271(a), of 
the process claims and system claims separately and focused on the 
situs of infringement.232  The court noted that “patent infringement 
occurs where the offending act is committed and not where the 
injury is felt.”233  The court recognized a distinction between “use” 
of a patented process and “use” of a patented system.234  The court 
held infringement of a process required completion of the entire 
process within the United States—“[b]ecause a process is nothing 
more than the sequence of actions of which it is comprised, the use 
of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the 
steps recited.”235  Since the defendant completed one of the 
necessary steps in Canada, the defendant did not complete all the 
steps of the patented process within the United States, and thus, the 
defendant did not “use” the claimed process, under § 271(a).236  
The court examined the alternative prongs of § 271(a) and, relying 
 
 230 Id. at 1288–89. 
 231 Id. at 1287. 
 232 Id. at 1316.  “The situs of the infringing act is a ‘purely physical occurrence.’” Id. 
(quoting N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc. 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 233 Id. (quoting Philips, 35 F.3d at 1579). 
 234 Id. at 1317.  The court distinguished the analysis in Deepsouth, stating “[a]lthough 
the Supreme Court focused on the whole operable assembly of a system claim for 
infringement in Deepsouth, there is no corresponding operable assembly of a process 
claim.” Id. at 1317–18.  See also In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing distinction between device claims and method claims). 
 235 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1318 (“A method or process consists of one or more operative 
steps, and accordingly, ‘[i]t is well established that a patent for a method or process is not 
infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized.’” (quoting Roberts 
Dairy Co. v. U.S., 530 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976))). 
 236 Id. (stating holding).  As a consequence to finding no direct infringement of the 
process claim, the defendant is not liable for contributory or induced infringement of the 
process claim. Id. 
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on the legislative history, held that in the context of process claims, 
§ 271(a) was limited to “use.”237 
2. “Use” of a System under § 271(a) 
Contrary to the court’s finding for process claims, the court 
found territoriality for the system claims because the system was 
“used” within the United States, under § 271(a).238  Focusing on 
the situs of the infringement, the court applied the analysis from 
Decca, “[t]he use of claimed system under § 271(a) is the place at 
which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the place 
where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the 
system obtained.”239  RIM argued that since the relay station was 
located in Canada, the system was not subject to NTP’s claims.240  
The court distinguished the role of the relay station and the role of 
RIM’s customers.241  The relay station was merely a component of 
the Blackberry system, while the Blackberry users manipulated the 
handheld devices, and initiated and received e-mails within the 
United States, thus the users controlled and benefited from the 
system within the United States.242  Therefore, the court held the 
situs of the infringement of the system claims was within the 
United States and thus, RIM infringed NTP’s system claims.243 
The Federal Circuit has developed a unique two-factor analysis 
of § 271(a) problems: a) the type of infringement and b) the type of 
patent claim.  However, the following questions remain: First, is it 
 
 237 Id. at 1319 (“The Senate Report explains, ‘Under our current patent laws, a patent on 
a process gives the patentholder the right to exclude others from using that process in the 
United States without authorization from the patentholder.  The other two standard 
aspects of the patent right—the exclusive right to make or sell the invention—are not 
directly applicable to a patented process.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 30 (1987))).  
For discussion on the court’s analysis of process claims under § 271(f) and § 271(g), see 
supra Part I.B.2 and Part I.B.3. 
 238 Id. at 1317. 
 239 Id. (citing Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976)). 
 240 Id. (referring to RIM’s appeal of jury finding that system claims occurred within the 
United States). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  For a similar conclusion that an essential component is insufficient to find 
territoriality, see Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 
2d 11, 17 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 243 See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317. 
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appropriate to treat various claims differently under U.S. patent 
law?  Second, with respect to “use” of transnational systems, under 
§ 271(a), how much is enough? 
B. AT&T v. Microsoft 
In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,244 the Federal Circuit 
considered foreign replication of software code originally exported 
from the United States territorial subject matter because the 
original software code was a component supplied for subsequent 
identical software inventions, under § 271(f).245  Defendant 
Microsoft exported disks with master versions of its software for 
purposes of replication outside the United States.246  The plaintiff’s 
patent claimed a speech codec247 that defendant’s software 
allegedly infringed.248  At trial Microsoft moved in limine to 
exclude evidence of foreign sales of its software and the parties 
converted the motion into partial summary judgment.249  The lower 
court held software was a “component,” under § 271(f), and 
foreign copies of the software “were not shielded from § 271(f) in 
light of the statute’s purpose of prohibiting the circumvention of 
infringement through exportation.”250 
The Federal Circuit focused on the ease of replication in 
software distribution and interpreted § 271(f) in the light of 
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication 
 
 244 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 476 (2006) (mem.). 
 245 See id. at 1370.  The court held § 271(f) liability extended to copies of software made 
abroad because § 271(f) expressly described that supplying and copying, in terms of 
software distribution, “is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying’ . . . .” Id.  The court affirmed 
the lower court’s ruling, pursuant to Eolas v. Microsoft, that the master version of the 
software was a component. Id. at 1369 (citing Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
399 F.3d 1325, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)). 
 246 Id. at 1368. 
 247 A “codec” is a software program that codes and decodes signals.  Coding compresses 
the signal and decoding expands signal to original form. Id. at 1328 n.1. 
 248 Id. at 1368. 
 249 Id.  Microsoft’s motion in limine contained two arguments: 1) “component,” under 
§ 271(f), did not include intangible software; and 2) “supplied,” under § 271(f), did not 
apply because the software was installed on foreign-assembled computers abroad. Id. 
 250 Id.  The lower court’s reasoning that software is a “component” is similar to the 
lower court’s reasoning in Eolas. See Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331–32. 
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Congress intended them to bear some different import.”251  The 
court emphasized that a single copy of software uploaded to a 
server could “allow any number of exact copies to be downloaded, 
and hence ‘supplied.’”252  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s assertion that § 271(f) liability should only extend to 
each exported disk because it “fail[ed] to account for the realities 
of software distribution.”253  The Federal Circuit emphasized that it 
would be contrary to the legislative intent behind § 271(f) to allow 
advances in technology to circumvent § 271(f).254  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit held copying of software abroad is tantamount to 
supplying for purposes of § 271(f).255 
Judge Rader, author of the Eolas opinion, wrote a strongly-
worded dissent in which he equated copying with manufacturing 
and accused the majority of “provid[ing] extraterritorial 
expansion” of U.S. patent law by penalizing acts wholly done 
outside the United States.256  The Supreme Court has recently 
granted certiorari.257 
The question remains, with respect to “supplying” of intangible 
goods, under § 271(f): Where is the line separating the reach of 
U.S. patent law and acts done wholly outside the U.S.? 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Part A of this section discusses the benefits of the two-factor 
analysis employed by the Federal Circuit in NTP and suggests 
approaches to the in-between cases.  Part B of this section 
 
 251 AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 252 Id. at 1370. 
 253 Id. (stating the cost-saving nature of software distribution realized by shipping 
minimal goods and replicating products on site).  The Federal Circuit refused Microsoft’s 
reading of § 271(f) because it would lead to absurd results. Id. 
 254 Id. at 1371 (“It would be unsound to construe a statutory provision that was 
originally enacted to encourage advances in technology by closing a loophole, in a 
manner that allows the very advances in technology thus encouraged to subvert that 
intent.”). 
 255 See id. at 1370. 
 256 Id. at 1372–73 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 257 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
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discusses the problematic analysis of the Federal Circuit in AT&T 
and suggests an alternative approach. 
A. Double-Barreled Approach is Appropriate for § 271(a) 
The two-factor analysis employed by the Federal Circuit in 
NTP for § 271(a) is appropriate because the analysis captures 
activities that are substantially within the U.S. while not 
overextending the reach of U.S. patent law.  In NTP, RIM 
allegedly infringed two different claim types: process claims and 
system claims.258  The Federal Circuit found territoriality for the 
system claims and not the process claims because the court held 
that the concept of “use” of a system differed from the concept of 
“use” of a process, under § 271(a).259  The court held close to the 
abstract idea of a process: it is merely a series of steps.260  The 
court found, as a matter of law, that RIM could not have used the 
process invention within the United States because it did not 
complete all the necessary steps of the process within the United 
States.261  However, the court took a broader analytic approach to 
the “use” of a system, under § 271(a).262  Consequently, with 
respect to “use” under § 271(a), the court took a holistic approach 
to territoriality regarding the system claims and a bright-line 
approach regarding the process claims.263  Therefore, some subject 
matter is ripe for litigants to debate, like “use” of a system, under 
§ 271(a), and other subject matter is not in play because of bright-
line rules, like “use” of a process, under § 271(a).264 
 
 258 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). 
 259 See id. at 1317. 
 260 See id. at 1318. 
 261 See id. 
 262 See id. at 1317.  The Federal Circuit applied a beneficial use and control-oriented 
analyses to find RIM “used” the Blackberry system within the United States, under 
§ 271(a). Id. 
 263 See id. at 1316–18. 
 264 See id. The bright-line rule for “use” of process patents precludes beneficial use and 
control-oriented analyses. 
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1. How Much is Enough? 
With respect to “use” of transnational systems, under § 271(a): 
How much is enough?  Freedom Wireless and NTP both dealt with 
transnational wireless communication systems but the court in 
Freedom Wireless did not find territoriality and the court in NTP 
did.265  These two cases are on opposites sides of the spectrum.  
For example: If a transnational system has a bulk of its network 
outside the United States, then Freedom Wireless would apply and 
there is no territoriality.266  If a transnational system has a bulk of 
its network inside the United States, then NTP would apply and 
there is territoriality. 
But what if the transnational system has equal parts outside and 
inside the United States?  The control-oriented analysis may 
provide an answer, but large multinational corporations may divest 
control to several points, making the location of control fertile 
ground for contention.  A litigant can thrust and parry arguments 
pinpointing the location of control to sway the court in finding or 
not finding territoriality.  Another possible tactic is to analyze 
territorial impact factors in a balancing test to quantify the 
economic impact of the invention on U.S. markets, thus avoiding 
statutory formalities and preserving the essence of territorial patent 
protection.267 
B. Unlimited Liability for Intangible Property is Inappropriate 
for § 271(f) 
With respect to the export of intangible property, under 
§ 271(f), one question arises: When does infringement end and 
wholly foreign activity begin?  The Federal Circuit has recently 
answered that for infringement of intangible property, it does not 
end.  In AT&T, the Federal Circuit held that foreign replication of 
 
 265 See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 
(D. Mass. 2002) (stating holding); NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317 (stating holding). 
 266 See Freedom Wireless, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating holding). 
 267 See Elizabeth M. N. Morris, Territorial Impact Factors: An Argument for 
Determining Patent Infringement Based Upon Impact on the U.S. Market, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 351, 352 (2006).  Morris argues that the territorial 
impact factors are: “(1) control, (2) ownership, and (3) beneficial use of the allegedly 
infringing product.” Id. at 368. 
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software is territorial subject matter.268  AT&T drew its analysis 
from Eolas, but Eolas did not address whether foreign replication 
of software was territorial or not, it merely characterized software 
code as components of software inventions.269  Judge Rader, 
author of Eolas, vigorously dissented in AT&T fearing the “parade 
of horribles” that may befall the software industry as a result of the 
majority’s holding.270  At bottom, the majority’s holding converted 
AT&T’s U.S. patent into a global patent.271  Further, the AT&T 
panel departed from the Supreme Court’s maxim in Deepsouth: 
“[W]e . . . insist on a clear congressional indication of intent to 
extend the patent privilege . . . .”272  The Supreme Court has 
recently granted certiorari and the boundless tide of extraterritorial 
reach the AT&T opinion has unleashed may finally recede.273 
The Solicitor General opines that the tide should turn.274  In an 
amicus brief, the Solicitor General points out the contradictory 
holdings of AT&T and Pellegrini.275  The Federal Circuit in 
Pellegrini held that § 271(f) only applied to components 
“physically present in the United States and then either sold or 
exported.”276  In addition, AT&T contradicts Pellegrini on yet 
another level. 
Should Microsoft be liable for copies manufactured overseas, 
then liability would either be: (a) unlimited; or (b) limited to the 
copies it knew of or induced to be made overseas.  I suggest these 
 
 268 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
 269 Id. at 1369 (citing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)) (discussing whether software is a 
“component” under § 271(f)). 
 270 AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 271 See id. at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting).  The majority opinion “suggests that AT&T 
might otherwise have no remedy for infringement occurring wholly outside the United 
States.  AT&T, however, is not left without remedy.  AT&T can protect its foreign 
markets from foreign competitors by obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.” Id. 
 272 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972). 
 273 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
 274 See generally Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae, Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 2006 WL 2805326. 
 275 See id. at 13 (quoting Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
 276 Id. 
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two answers because endless copies can be reproduced, but the 
exporter could only intend a certain amount to be copied.  Either 
the exporter is liable for every copy subsequently made or he is 
liable for those copies he intended, expected or foresaw to be 
produced.  The first proposition is absurd and therefore should be 
dismissed for regulating wholly foreign activities.277  The second 
proposition should also be dismissed because it is tantamount to a 
tenuous control-oriented analysis.278  Pellegrini stood for the 
proposition that export of instructions to induce infringement 
abroad was not within the scope of § 271(f) because the defendant 
did not supply any physical components.279  The Pellegrini court 
dismissed any notion of a control-oriented analysis to substitute for 
the physical supply requirement of § 271(f) problems.280  
Therefore, the AT&T court’s imposition of liability on Microsoft 
was inappropriate because it either lays Microsoft open to infinite 
liability or the AT&T court contradicts itself by employing a weak 
control-oriented analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although there is a traditional presumption against 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, Congress has exercised its 
right to legislate extraterritorially by enacting § 271(f) and 
§ 271(g).  Courts have also given U.S. patent law extraterritorial 
effect by contextualizing the infringement statutes to suit specific 
types of patent claims and new technologies, such as software and 
networks.281  As technology progresses and the global economy 
spreads, territorial questions will continue to grow between the 
cracks in the concrete of U.S. patent law.  Through contextual 
analytic approaches, such as the two-factor analysis employed by 
 
 277 See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) 
(stating infringement “cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”) 
 278 See Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118 (holding dissemination of instructions did not 
satisfy physical supply requirement of § 271(f)).  See also supra note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
 279 Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118. 
 280 Id. 
 281 See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.). 
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the NTP court, courts can preserve the spirit of U.S. patent law and 
not violate proscriptions against extending extraterritorial reach to 
U.S. patent law.282  Courts should also recognize that in keeping 
with the spirit of the U.S. patent law, they should observe the 
longstanding principle that U.S. patent law does not cover acts 
occurring wholly outside the U.S. and avoid decisions that lead to 
absurd conclusions. 
The best alternative to boundless and absurd conclusions is for 
the courts to take a conservative approach and wait for legislative 
action.  It worked for the critics of Deepsouth. 
 
 282 See generally NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). 
